Seminar Banking

(Literature Seminar)

Seminar in Empirical Banking

 

Instructor

Prof. Dr. Andre Guettler

 

General description

The seminar in empirical banking is for Master students. There is a maximum of 18 participants. Students will form groups of two (or three). Students may provide grouping and paper preferences but there are no guarantees. Each group is assigned a paper (see below). There are no further textbooks but students are required to read related academic papers. The seminar thesis and its corresponding presentation need to summarize the paper and it should also discuss the paper’s strengths and weaknesses. For the latter, refer to these general guidelines for referee reports to scrutinize academic papers (even though you do not need to make any accept / reject recommendations!). The presentations will take place on one day towards the end of the winter semester.

 

Language

The seminar language (seminar thesis, presentation, discussion etc.) is English.

 

Grading (per group)

-        - 50%: seminar thesis 

-        - 50%: presentation

 

Papers (make sure that you use the published version of the article, if published already, and not to use an older working paper version!)

1) Loan officers

1.1) Petra Lederle & Fatih Buzluk

Paravisini, D., Hertzberg, A., Liberti, J. M. (2010): Information and Incentives Inside the Firm: Evidence from Loan Officer Rotation, Journal of Finance 65, 795-828

 

1.2) Gabriel Betancourt Herrera, Gizem Kirlikova & Syed Hussain

Berg, T., Puri, M., Rochol, J. (2013): Loan Officer Incentives and the Limits of Hard Information, working paper

 

1.3) Liyan Feng & Eunice Amon

Drexler, A., Schoar, A. (2013): Do Relationships Matter? Evidence from Loan Officer Turnover, Management Science, forthcoming

 

1.4) Annika Hanke & Claudia Brunkal

Cole, S., Kanz, M., Klapper, L. (2014): Incentivizing Calculated Risk-Taking: Evidence from an Experiment with Commercial Bank Loan Officers, Journal of Finance, forthcoming.

 

1.5) Marija Hubasvili, Anton Barlit & Alena Pashkova

Agarwal, S., Ben-David, I. (2013): Do Loan Officers’ Incentives Lead to Lax Lending Standards?, working paper.

 

 

 

2) Relationship lending and public guarantees

2.1) Daria Kuzmina & Elena Veklich 

Gropp, R., Gruendl, C., Guettler, A. (2014): Hidden Gems and Borrowers with Dirty Little Secrets: Investment in Soft Information, Borrower Self-selection and Competition, working paper.

 

 

2.3) Uladzislau Lapko, Omar Aba & Alisa Khisamova

Liberti, J.  M. , Mian, A.  R. (2009): Estimating the Effect of Hierarchies on Information Use, Review of Financial Studies 22, 4057-4090.

 

Assignment to seminar topics and formal registration

Participants are requested to register in the HIS Online-Portal / university portal until 30 October 2014. Otherwise no participation is possible.

 

Schedule

-Submission deadline for the seminar thesis: December 18, 2014,12 noon (one printed seminar theses to be handed in at the office of Anette Lesle and also as PDF file to Professor Guettler; both need to meet the deadline!)

-Presentation: January 20, 2015, 2-7 pm (Helmholtzstr. 22, room 219)