ULME: The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment

Zeit : Donnerstag , 16:15 - 17:15 Uhr
Ort : Helmholtzstraße 18, Raum 1.20,

Das Institut für Wirtschaftswissenschaften lädt wieder herzlich zum Forschungsseminar ULME ein. Wir freuen wir uns sehr,  Simeon Schudy (LMU München) begrüßen zu dürfen, der einen Vortrag mit dem Titel „The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence from a Field Experiment“ halten wird. Simeon Schudy vertritt derzeit die Professur für Behavioral and Experimental Economics an der LMU München. Einen Abstrakt zum Vortrag finden Sie anbei.

Im Anschluss wird sich wieder zu einem gemeinsamen Abendessen in der Ulmer Innenstadt eingefunden.

Abstact: Despite the prevalence of non-routine, analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in such tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the completion probability of a non-routine analytical team task. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role.  Bonus incentives increase performance due to the monetary reward rather than the reference point they provide. Treatment effects replicate in an additional sample of presumably less intrinsically motivated workers. Incentives reduce only these workers' willingness to "explore'' original solutions.