Nataša Trkulja

This report documents the program and the outcomes of Dagstuhl Seminar 22042 "Privacy Protection of Automated and Self-Driving Vehicles". The Seminar reviewed existing privacy-enhancing technologies, standards, tools, and frameworks for protecting personal information in the context of automated and self-driving vehicles (AVs). We specifically focused on where such existing techniques clash with requirements of an AV and its data processing and identified the major road blockers on the way to deployment of privacy protection in AVs from a legal, technical, business and ethical perspective. Therefore, the seminar took an interdisciplinary approach involving autonomous and connected driving, privacy protection, and legal data protection experts. This report summarizes the discussions and findings during the seminar, includes the abstracts of talks, and includes a report from the working groups.

Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) has been adopted by the FCC as the technology standard for safety related transportation and vehicular communications in the US. C-V2X allows vehicles to self-manage the network in absence of a cellular base-station. Since C-V2X networks convey safety-critical messages, it is crucial to assess their security posture. This work contributes a novel set of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on CV2X networks. The attacks are caused by adversarial resource block selection and vary in sophistication and efficiency. In particular, we consider “oblivious” adversaries that ignore recent transmission activity on resource blocks, “smart” adversaries that do monitor activity on each resource block, and “cooperative” adversaries that work together to ensure they attack different targets. We analyze and simulate these attacks to showcase their effectiveness. Assuming a fixed number of attackers, we show that at low vehicle density, smart and cooperative attacks can significantly impact network performance, while at high vehicle density, oblivious attacks are almost as effective as the more sophisticated attacks.

Cellular Vehicle-to-Everything (C-V2X) networks are increasingly adopted by automotive original equipment manufacturers (OEMs). C-V2X, as defined in 3GPP Release 14 Mode 4, allows vehicles to self-manage the network in absence of a cellular base-station. Since C-V2X networks convey safety-critical messages, it is crucial to assess their security posture. This work contributes a novel set of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks on C-V2X networks operating in Mode 4. The attacks are caused by adversarial resource block selection and vary in sophistication and efficiency. In particular, we consider "oblivious" adversaries that ignore recent transmission activity on resource blocks, "smart" adversaries that do monitor activity on each resource block, and "cooperative" adversaries that work together to ensure they attack different targets. We analyze and simulate these attacks to showcase their effectiveness. Assuming a fixed number of attackers, we show that at low vehicle density, smart and cooperative attacks can significantly impact network performance, while at high vehicle density, oblivious attacks are almost as effective as the more sophisticated attacks.